MIA presents a compelling case in asserting that social networks are, and will be, the prime determinant of organizational success. Upon closer examination, however, they commit a few obvious errors in their presentation of the role networks play in organizational behavior. In particular, their defense is based on two assertions. First, that social networks facilitate connectivity with previously untapped populations, and second, the networks efficiently identify “networked individuals.” These points are certainly accurate, but there is no reason to believe that these two reasons alone necessarily prove that social networks will drive success through 2025. You don’t need to be a Tufts Professor to see what Daniel Drezner points to when he states that just because a social movement is happening, doesn’t mean it is a success. (1)
Let’s look at the first point. MIA argues that networks facilitate connectivity with untapped populations, citing examples from the Obama campaign and the US Embassy in Jakarta as examples. Both the only thing these examples really prove is that for organizations to succeed, they most constantly innovate and adapt. It’s true that both actors were successful in this case because they mobilize untapped populations—but the world will likely change by 2025. MIA gives us no reason to believe that the conditions that exist now will exist in 2025, nor do they give us reason to believe that social networks determinants of success have so radically changed the way we communicate that new innovations cannot have the same effect.
Second, MIA argues that social network analysis yields greater efficiency in “reaching and measuring networked individuals.” That seems intuitive and obvious—but also somewhat tautological. The essence of this argument is, basically, that organizations are becoming more efficient because they are becoming more efficient. For the first time, data mining information on information is available. Our connections to one another, and the nature of them, are quantifiable and observable. That’s the real difference here that MIA fails to directly address. As a result, their argument leaves us wanting more—we again have no evidence that our connections will remain observable over time, and that these connections will be as critical to our behavior as they are now.
Both of these reasons seem to converge on MIA’s presentation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is a useful, interesting example of a network that has formed in response to an international environment that is both inflexible and immovable. But the weaknesses identified above are inherent in MIA’s presentation of this example. Because the argument fails to tell us why innovation will remain focused on networks, and because they fail to tell us how these networks will be observed in the future, we don’t really know what to make of PSI. Networks like this have emerged in the past, and on most occasions, they fail: nations, like other unitary actors, free ride, waiver in their commitments, and ultimately do what is in their interest irrespective of their informal commitments. That is perhaps why the PSI only includes half of the world’s countries; no country with a record of state-sponsored WMD trafficking has signed on. What happened to the ability of networks to tap into “untapped populations”?
In conclusion, our colleagues make many valid points, but they are far from convincing. We have indeed learned from their observations that social networks can help an organization. But so can good management, leadership, and financial incentives. The only difference is that the aforementioned have already proved they are critical to organizational success, while social networks have not. We have no reason to assume it will demonstrably take the upper hand in less than 20 years.
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